From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
To: Sreeraj S Kurup <sreekuttan2156239@gmail.com>,
linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kbusch@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk,
hch@lst.de, sagi@grimberg.me
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nvme: auth: validate DHCHAP secret before stopping authentication
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 09:07:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0632ec1e-dcd3-42f9-bd0c-a809a6f6db09@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261003125115.2523-1-sreekuttan2156239@gmail.com>
On 10/3/26 2:51 PM, Sreeraj S Kurup wrote:
> Hi Hannes,
>
> Yes, I agree that stopping the currently running authentication when the admin
> requests a new one is intentional.
>
> The issue I was pointing out is slightly different: if the new key is invalid,
> we never actually get to the point where the new authentication can be
> started again. "nvme_auth_stop()" has already stopped the existing
> authentication, and the parser returns an error before the restart
> path is reached.>
> So the question is whether writing an invalid replacement key should
> leave the previous authentication stopped, or whether the key should
> first be parsed/validated and only then replace the existing
> authentication state.>
> If the intended semantics are that an invalid key write should not
> disturb an already running authentication, then moving the validation
> before "nvme_auth_stop()" would make the operation effectively
> transactional:>
> validate new key
> -> error: leave existing authentication unchanged
> -> success: stop old authentication and start with new key
>
> If, however, the intended semantics are that any attempted replacement
> stops the existing authentication even when the replacement is
> invalid, then I agree that the current behaviour is intentional and
> the patch doesn't fix a bug.>
Hmm. Actually, I'm not sure. Both sides have something going for it.
Stopping the transaction first follows the perceived will of the admin
to start a new authentication. And that will is arguably independent
on the question as to whether the new key is valid.
But at the same time one cannot start a new authentication if the key
is invalid.
So I don't know. Let me think.
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-08 7:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-17 8:04 Sreeraj S Kurup
2026-09-21 13:49 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-03 12:51 ` Sreeraj S Kurup
2026-10-08 7:07 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2026-10-03 13:09 ` Sreeraj S Kurup
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