From: Viacheslav Dubeyko <vdubeyko@redhat.com>
To: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>,
slava@dubeyko.com, glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de,
frank.li@vivo.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+c0ba772a362e70937dfb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] hfsplus: fix null-ptr-deref in hfsplus_cat_write_inode
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 14:48:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1929bc40bee602937aac95a3d338614b5fe7e082.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260415014345.77796-1-kartikey406@gmail.com>
On Wed, 2026-04-15 at 07:13 +0530, Deepanshu Kartikey wrote:
> When a corrupt HFS+ image is mounted where the hidden directory is
> absent, hfsplus_fill_super() handles -ENOENT from
> hfsplus_get_hidden_dir_entry() silently and continues with
> sbi->hidden_dir left as NULL.
>
> hfsplus_link() and hfsplus_unlink() call
> hfsplus_cat_write_inode(sbi->hidden_dir) unconditionally without
> checking whether hidden_dir is NULL, triggering a general protection
> fault caught by KASAN as a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x28.
>
> Other call sites in dir.c already guard against this by checking
> hidden_dir for NULL before use. Apply the same guard to the two
> unprotected call sites in hfsplus_link() and hfsplus_unlink().
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Correct fix location: guard sbi->hidden_dir before calling
> hfsplus_cat_write_inode() in hfsplus_link() and hfsplus_unlink()
> in dir.c, as suggested by Vyacheslav Dubeyko.
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Fixed commit message: hfsplus_delete_cat() is called from
> multiple callers, not just hfsplus_unlink() as incorrectly
> stated in v1.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+c0ba772a362e70937dfb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c0ba772a362e70937dfb
> Tested-by: syzbot+c0ba772a362e70937dfb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
> ---
> fs/hfsplus/dir.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/dir.c b/fs/hfsplus/dir.c
> index d559bf8625f8..a7feef53d8cb 100644
> --- a/fs/hfsplus/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/hfsplus/dir.c
> @@ -362,9 +362,11 @@ static int hfsplus_link(struct dentry *src_dentry, struct inode *dst_dir,
> if (res)
> goto out;
>
> - res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(sbi->hidden_dir);
> - if (res)
> - goto out;
> + if (sbi->hidden_dir) {
> + res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(sbi->hidden_dir);
> + if (res)
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(inode);
>
> @@ -431,11 +433,10 @@ static int hfsplus_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> out:
> if (!res) {
> res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(dir);
> - if (!res) {
> + if (!res && sbi->hidden_dir)
> res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(sbi->hidden_dir);
> - if (!res)
> - res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(inode);
> - }
> + if (!res)
> + res = hfsplus_cat_write_inode(inode);
> }
>
> mutex_unlock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
As far as I can see, we have such logic in hfsplus_fill_super() [1]:
if (!sb_rdonly(sb)) {
<skipped>
if (!sbi->hidden_dir) {
<create hidden dir>
}
<skipped>
}
So, I have two questions:
(1) If we mounted volume in READ-ONLY mode initially and we re-mount it into
READ-WRITE mode, then we skip hidden directory creation. Should we process this
in hfsplus_reconfigure()?
(2) Should we create hidden directory if corrupted volume hasn't hidden
directory?
If we don't create the hidden dir, then we could have troubles in multiple
places: hfsplus_rename_cat() [2,3], hfsplus_delete_cat() [4,5]. It looks like
that we need to create the hidden dir. Otherwise, we could trigger the kernel
crash in multiple places.
Thanks,
Slava.
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/fs/hfsplus/super.c#L589
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/fs/hfsplus/dir.c#L326
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/fs/hfsplus/dir.c#L397
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/fs/hfsplus/dir.c#L418
[5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/fs/hfsplus/inode.c#L257
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-15 21:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-15 1:43 Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-04-15 21:48 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko [this message]
2026-04-21 1:44 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-04-22 17:50 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
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