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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH06/17] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 16:16:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140709151604.23074.4848.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140709151525.23074.32315.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
message as far as possible.  If any signature that we should be able to verify
fails, we reject the whole lot.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c |   88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 745e5c8..51ff36f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -170,6 +170,91 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 }
 
 /*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+		x509->seen = true;
+		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		if (x509->issuer)
+			pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+		if (x509->authority)
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+
+		if (!x509->authority ||
+		    (x509->subject &&
+		     strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0)) {
+			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
+			 * authority.
+			 */
+			pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
+			if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
+			    memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+				return 0;
+
+			ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			x509->signer = x509;
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+		 * list to see if the next one is there.
+		 */
+		pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
+		for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+			pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
+			if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
+			    strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
+			    memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+				goto found_issuer;
+		}
+
+		/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+		pr_debug("- top\n");
+		return 0;
+
+	found_issuer:
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+		if (p->seen) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		x509->signer = p;
+		if (x509 == p) {
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		x509 = p;
+		might_sleep();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
  */
 static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
@@ -201,7 +286,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 	pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
 
-	return 0;
+	/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+	return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
 }
 
 /**


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-09 15:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-09 15:15 [PATCH 00/17] KEYS: PKCS#7 and PE file signature checking for kexec David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH01/17] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7 David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH02/17] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH03/17] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315] David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH04/17] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH05/17] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` David Howells [this message]
2014-07-10 17:06   ` [PATCH06/17] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain Valdis.Kletnieks
2014-07-10 20:37   ` David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH07/17] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keys David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH08/17] PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7 David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH09/17] KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistake David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH10/17] Provide PE binary definitions David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH11/17] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH12/17] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH13/17] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blob David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH14/17] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob David Howells
2014-07-09 15:17 ` [PATCH15/17] pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OID David Howells
2014-07-09 15:17 ` [PATCH16/17] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 data David Howells
2014-07-09 15:17 ` [PATCH17/17] pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain David Howells
2014-07-09 16:03 ` [PATCH 00/17] KEYS: PKCS#7 and PE file signature checking for kexec Borislav Petkov
2014-07-09 16:21   ` Vivek Goyal
2014-07-09 16:28 ` David Howells

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