From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>,
Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] crypto: crypto_user_stat - Zeroize whole structure given to user space
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2018 14:56:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181103215603.16250-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181103215603.16250-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
For preventing uninitialized data to be given to user-space (and so leak
potential useful data), the crypto_stat structure must be correctly
initialized.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: cac5818c25d0 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
[EB: also fix it in crypto_reportstat_one()]
[EB: use sizeof(var) rather than sizeof(type)]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/crypto_user_stat.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user_stat.c b/crypto/crypto_user_stat.c
index 021ad06bbb628..1dfaa0ccd555b 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user_stat.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user_stat.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int crypto_report_aead(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&raead, 0, sizeof(raead));
+
strncpy(raead.type, "aead", sizeof(raead.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->encrypt_cnt);
@@ -65,6 +67,8 @@ static int crypto_report_cipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rcipher, 0, sizeof(rcipher));
+
strlcpy(rcipher.type, "cipher", sizeof(rcipher.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->encrypt_cnt);
@@ -93,6 +97,8 @@ static int crypto_report_comp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rcomp, 0, sizeof(rcomp));
+
strlcpy(rcomp.type, "compression", sizeof(rcomp.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->compress_cnt);
rcomp.stat_compress_cnt = v32;
@@ -120,6 +126,8 @@ static int crypto_report_acomp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&racomp, 0, sizeof(racomp));
+
strlcpy(racomp.type, "acomp", sizeof(racomp.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->compress_cnt);
racomp.stat_compress_cnt = v32;
@@ -147,6 +155,8 @@ static int crypto_report_akcipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rakcipher, 0, sizeof(rakcipher));
+
strncpy(rakcipher.type, "akcipher", sizeof(rakcipher.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->encrypt_cnt);
rakcipher.stat_encrypt_cnt = v32;
@@ -177,6 +187,8 @@ static int crypto_report_kpp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
struct crypto_stat rkpp;
u32 v;
+ memset(&rkpp, 0, sizeof(rkpp));
+
strlcpy(rkpp.type, "kpp", sizeof(rkpp.type));
v = atomic_read(&alg->setsecret_cnt);
@@ -203,6 +215,8 @@ static int crypto_report_ahash(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rhash, 0, sizeof(rhash));
+
strncpy(rhash.type, "ahash", sizeof(rhash.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->hash_cnt);
@@ -227,6 +241,8 @@ static int crypto_report_shash(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rhash, 0, sizeof(rhash));
+
strncpy(rhash.type, "shash", sizeof(rhash.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->hash_cnt);
@@ -251,6 +267,8 @@ static int crypto_report_rng(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
u64 v64;
u32 v32;
+ memset(&rrng, 0, sizeof(rrng));
+
strncpy(rrng.type, "rng", sizeof(rrng.type));
v32 = atomic_read(&alg->generate_cnt);
@@ -275,6 +293,8 @@ static int crypto_reportstat_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ memset(ualg, 0, sizeof(*ualg));
+
strlcpy(ualg->cru_name, alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
strlcpy(ualg->cru_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
@@ -291,6 +311,7 @@ static int crypto_reportstat_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_stat rl;
+ memset(&rl, 0, sizeof(rl));
strlcpy(rl.type, "larval", sizeof(rl.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_STAT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_stat), &rl))
--
2.19.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-03 21:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-03 21:55 [PATCH 0/4] crypto: crypto_user reporting fixes and cleanups Eric Biggers
2018-11-03 21:56 ` [PATCH 1/4] crypto: crypto_user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace Eric Biggers
2018-11-03 21:56 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2018-11-03 21:56 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto: crypto_user - remove redundant reporting functions Eric Biggers
2018-11-03 21:56 ` [PATCH 4/4] crypto: crypto_user - clean up report structure copying Eric Biggers
2018-11-09 9:46 ` [PATCH 0/4] crypto: crypto_user reporting fixes and cleanups Herbert Xu
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