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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] assoc_array: Preserve full words when splitting shortcuts
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 15:42:57 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261006154257.61196a7ca6f64b9a0156d17e@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <asV3UaPsA2xSz8Cc@com-75606>

On Tue, 6 Oct 2026 15:33:53 -0700 Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 06, 2026 at 03:25:08PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Tue,  6 Oct 2026 15:06:38 -0700 Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > assoc_array_insert_mid_shortcut() copies enough index-key words for the
> > > new pre-shortcut, then masks off the unused bits in its last word.  If
> > > diff is word-aligned, the shift is zero and the mask clears that entire
> > > word, even though all of it belongs to the required prefix.  The new
> > > shortcut no longer matches the objects behind it, so lookups can fail
> > > for both the existing objects and the new one.
> > > 
> > > For example, inserting a user key with a different description length
> > > into a keyring containing enough full-hash collisions can split a
> > > shortcut at bit 64 and erase its hash word.  The resulting search
> > > failure can also expose the pointer-dependent keyring hash as a KASLR
> > > oracle.
> > > 
> > > Only trim the last word when diff ends inside it.  This mirrors
> > > commit bb2ba2d75a2d ("assoc_array: Fix shortcut creation"), which fixed
> > > the terminal-node case, and leaves non-word-aligned splits unchanged.
> > 
> > Thanks.
> > 
> > When fixing a bug please clearly describe the userspace-visible runtime
> > effects of that bug.  Including how-to-hit-it, reproducer, user reports, etc.
> 
> Hi Andrew,
> 
> Thanks for the response.
> As mentioned in the commit message, a search failure can expose the
> pointer-dependent keyring hash as a KASLR oracle. As a result, a local
> unprivileged user can use this to leak kernel pointer and bypass KASLR.

I googled it.

: In computer security and exploit development, a KASLR oracle is any
: mechanism or vulnerability that allows an attacker to reliably
: determine whether a specific virtual memory address contains valid
: kernel code or data.  
: 
: The term "oracle" comes from cryptography and computer science, meaning
: a black box that answers a specific question in this case, "Is there
: kernel memory loaded at this guessed address?" By querying this oracle
: repeatedly for different memory ranges, an attacker can pinpoint the
: exact base address of the kernel, completely neutralizing Kernel
: Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR)

oh.  Hadn't heard that one before.

Anyway, please add those cc's and resend, thanks.


      reply	other threads:[~2026-10-06 22:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-06 22:06 Kyle Zeng
2026-10-06 22:25 ` Andrew Morton
2026-10-06 22:33   ` Kyle Zeng
2026-10-06 22:42     ` Andrew Morton [this message]

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