From: mlevitsk@redhat.com
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: d.riley@proxmox.com, jon@nutanix.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 10:31:13 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <645c5adca68427d0f0964cefe016a01be9a521f7.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505195226.563317-26-pbonzini@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2026-05-05 at 21:52 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> GMET allows page table entries to be created with U=0 in NPT.
> However, when GMET=1 U=0 only affects execution, not reads or
> writes. Ignore user faults on non-fetch accesses for NPT GMET.
>
> Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 10 +++++++---
> 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 7dde4ca87752..1da3d5c59e15 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
> * cr4_smep is also set for EPT MBEC. Because it affects
> * which pages are considered non-present (bit 10 additionally
> * must be zero if MBEC is on) it has to be in the base role.
> + * It also has to be in the base role for AMD GMET because
> + * kernel-executable pages need to have U=0 with GMET enabled.
> */
> unsigned cr4_smep:1;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> index 1b354e1f2d81..ddf4e467c071 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits);
>
> void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
> - u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3);
> + u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3, u64 misc_ctl);
> void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
> int huge_page_level, bool accessed_dirty,
> bool mbec, gpa_t new_eptp);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 5a796ae8c396..a283b5078c61 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
> #include <asm/io.h>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
> +#include <asm/svm.h>
> #include <asm/vmx.h>
>
> #include "trace.h"
> @@ -5572,7 +5573,7 @@ reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly)
> (14 & (access) ? 1 << 14 : 0) | \
> (15 & (access) ? 1 << 15 : 0))
>
> -static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
> +static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool tdp, bool ept)
Hi!
I vote to call this 'npt' instead, because 'tdp' confuses me a lot,
it is used in kvm for so many things like the tdp_mmu and such.
What do you think?
> {
> unsigned index;
>
> @@ -5633,7 +5634,12 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
> /* Faults from kernel mode accesses to user pages */
> u16 kf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? 0 : u;
>
> - uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u16)~u : 0;
> + /*
> + * For NPT GMET, U=0 does not affect reads and writes. Fetches
> + * are handled below via cr4_smep.
While at it we might also want to add a comment saying that for regular NPT, U bit is checked,
but all NPT accesses are treated as user so it has to be effectively always 1.
(Assuming that APM is correct)
What do you think?
> + */
> + if (!(tdp && cr4_smep))
> + uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u16)~u : 0;
>
> if (efer_nx)
> ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u16)~x : 0;
> @@ -5744,7 +5750,7 @@ static void reset_guest_paging_metadata(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> return;
>
> reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, mmu);
> - update_permission_bitmask(mmu, false);
> + update_permission_bitmask(mmu, mmu == &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, false);
> update_pkru_bitmask(mmu);
> }
>
> @@ -5940,7 +5946,7 @@ static void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> }
>
> void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
> - u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3)
> + u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3, u64 misc_ctl)
> {
> struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
> struct kvm_mmu_role_regs regs = {
> @@ -5953,7 +5959,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
>
> /* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */
> WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode);
> - cpu_role.base.cr4_smep = false;
> + cpu_role.base.cr4_smep = (misc_ctl & SVM_MISC_ENABLE_GMET) != 0;
>
> root_role = cpu_role.base;
> root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
> @@ -6011,7 +6017,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
> context->gva_to_gpa = ept_gva_to_gpa;
> context->sync_spte = ept_sync_spte;
>
> - update_permission_bitmask(context, true);
> + update_permission_bitmask(context, true, true);
> context->pkru_mask = 0;
> reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly, huge_page_level);
> reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context, execonly);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index a1cffd274000..7adfa7da210d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> */
> kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(vcpu, svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cr4,
> svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.efer,
> - svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3);
> + svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3,
> + svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl);
> vcpu->arch.mmu->get_guest_pgd = nested_svm_get_tdp_cr3;
> vcpu->arch.mmu->get_pdptr = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr;
> vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit;
> @@ -2076,12 +2077,15 @@ static gpa_t svm_translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
> struct x86_exception *exception,
> u64 pte_access)
> {
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
>
> BUG_ON(!mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
>
> - /* NPT walks are always user-walks */
> - access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
> + /* Non-GMET walks are always user-walks */
> + if (!(svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl & SVM_MISC_ENABLE_GMET))
> + access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
Tiny nitpick: maybe add a 'nested_gmet_enabled' similar to nested_npt_enabled?
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
> +
> return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gpa, access, exception);
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-02 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-05 19:51 [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:19 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:21 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:25 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:27 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-06-02 15:29 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: hard code more bits in kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk [this message]
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:32 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-07 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Sean Christopherson
2026-05-07 17:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 10:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-11 10:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 11:07 ` David Riley
2026-05-14 2:11 ` Chao Gao
2026-05-14 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-12 14:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-12 16:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-15 14:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-15 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-19 8:02 ` David Riley
2026-08-05 12:35 ` Jonas Theisen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 [PATCH v4 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
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