From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 17:25:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0165ce9-d15b-eaef-a5e8-2aeb6bdc69f6@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-27-keescook@chromium.org>
On 9/20/2018 9:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit build-time
> ordering offered by CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, and adds all the exclusive LSMs
> to the ordered LSM initialization.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> security/Kconfig | 39 +--------------------------------------
> security/security.c | 23 +----------------------
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 33c9ac3cb759..a2e365420919 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -239,46 +239,9 @@ source security/yama/Kconfig
>
> source security/integrity/Kconfig
>
> -choice
> - prompt "Default security module"
> - default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
> - default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
> - default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
> - default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
> - default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> -
> - help
> - Select the security module that will be used by default if the
> - kernel parameter security= is not specified.
> -
> - config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
> - bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
> -
> - config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> - bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
> -
> - config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> - bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
> -
> - config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> - bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
> -
> - config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> - bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
> -
> -endchoice
> -
> -config DEFAULT_SECURITY
> - string
> - default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
> - default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> - default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> - default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> - default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> -
> config LSM_ORDER
> string "Default initialization order of builtin LSMs"
> - default "yama,loadpin,integrity"
> + default "yama,loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
If I want to compile all the major modules into my kernel and use
AppArmor by default would I use
default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo"
or
default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor"
When we have "blob-sharing" how could I compile in tomoyo,
but exclude it without a boot line option?
When we have full stacking, how could I compile in selinux
but exclude it?
> help
> A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
> Any LSMs left off this list will be link-order initialized
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f076fdc6b451..628e62fda5fe 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static void __init parse_lsm_order(const char *order, const char *origin)
>
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> - (lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0 &&
> strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> found = true;
> @@ -163,8 +162,7 @@ static void __init prepare_lsm_order(void)
>
> /* Add any missing LSMs, in link order. */
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> - (lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
> + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "link-time");
> }
>
> @@ -222,18 +220,6 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
> }
>
> -static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
> -{
> - struct lsm_info *lsm;
> -
> - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> - if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
> - continue;
> -
> - maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
> - }
> -}
> -
> /**
> * security_init - initializes the security framework
> *
> @@ -253,8 +239,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> GFP_KERNEL);
>
> /* Process "security=", if given. */
> - if (!chosen_major_lsm)
> - chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
> if (chosen_major_lsm) {
> struct lsm_info *lsm;
>
> @@ -275,11 +259,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> prepare_lsm_order();
> ordered_lsm_init();
>
> - /*
> - * Load all the remaining security modules.
> - */
> - major_lsm_init();
> -
> kfree(ordered_lsms);
> return 0;
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-21 0:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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