mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jacky Li <jackyli@google.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	 Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>,
	 Supraja Sridhara <suprajasri@google.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Return INVALID_INPUT on SNP req/resp buffer access failure
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 07:31:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aqlWt4jb4CSPnecN@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0b2d8858-b361-4a64-986a-4c179210fbec@amd.com>

On Mon, Sep 14, 2026, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 9/10/26 16:06, Jacky Li wrote:
> > Currently, snp_handle_(ext_)guest_req() returns -EIO when
> > kvm_{read/write/clear}_guest() fails while accessing guest-provided
> > buffers. Returning -EIO causes KVM_RUN to exit to userspace, likely
> > killing the VM.
> > 
> > Fix this by returning GHCB_HV_RESP_MALFORMED_INPUT with sub-error code
> > GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT to the guest and resuming the vCPU.
> > 
> > Per the GHCB specification, guest-provided GPA buffers that cannot
> > be accessed by the hypervisor (e.g. private pages) should be treated
> > as guest input errors. Because kvm_{read/write/clear}_guest() only
> > returns -EFAULT on failure, treating this failure as an invalid input
> > aligns with the definition of -EFAULT ("Bad address").
> > 
> > Returning GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT also matches existing SNP handling
> > in KVM, which already returns this error code for unaligned or
> > overlapping buffers. It also aligns with other hypercall implementations
> > in KVM (e.g. Hyper-V returning INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT on
> > kvm_read_guest() failures in kvm_hv_flush_tlb()).
> > 
> > Performing upfront validation (e.g. via kvm_mem_is_private()) is
> > avoided because it is prone to TOCTOU races with concurrent Page State
> > Changes.
> 
> I'm ok with this approach overall, but will we run into a sequence
> number problem now?
> 
> If the kvm_write_guest() in snp_handle_guest_req() fails, invalid input
> is going to be returned, but we will have successfully called
> SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST. The sequence number will have advanced in the
> firmware, but I think the guest will not think that it has and not
> increment the sequence number causing subsequent requests to fail. At
> that point the guest will need to zero out the associated VMPCK used and
> move to the next one (there are a max of 4). If this continues happening
> the guest will eventually not be able to make guest requests anymore.
> But, I guess, if the kvm_write_guest() is failing, we're probably
> already in a bad situation, so maybe it is fine.

Oof, "fine" is definitely not ideal though.  

> > @@ -4244,8 +4246,10 @@ static int snp_handle_guest_req(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_
> >  	if (ret && !fw_err)
> >  		return ret;
> >  
> > -	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, resp_gpa, sev->guest_resp_buf, PAGE_SIZE))
> > -		return -EIO;
> > +	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, resp_gpa, sev->guest_resp_buf, PAGE_SIZE)) {
> > +		svm_vmgexit_bad_input(svm, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
> > +		return 1;
> > +	}

What if we keep this one as -EIO (or better, change it to -EFAULT in a separate
patch?), but add a comment explaning why KVM needs to exit to userspace in this
particular case?  That would be a good compromise; if the guest is attempting to
access non-existent memory, the initial READ will fail, i.e. we still get most
of the behavior Jacky wants.  The only fatal case would be where either userspace
really did screw up, or the guest managed to find read-only memory (though I
would probably argue that's likely also a userspace bug?).

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-15 14:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-10 21:06 Jacky Li
2026-09-10 22:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-11  1:00   ` Jacky Li
2026-09-14 14:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-09-15 14:31   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-09-15 15:21     ` Tom Lendacky
2026-09-16  2:25       ` Jacky Li
2026-09-16 18:33         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-21 18:16           ` Jacky Li
2026-09-21 18:52             ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-22 20:28               ` Jacky Li

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=aqlWt4jb4CSPnecN@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=jackyli@google.com \
    --cc=jacobhxu@google.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=suprajasri@google.com \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®