From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2010 21:37:52 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <v2ocb0375e11004201837ib470c98dj9fea78d2d75799df@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1271767039.30027.50.camel@moss-pluto.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@mit.edu):
>> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
>> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
>> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
>> > question is well-written.
>>
>> hmm...
>>
>> A good point.
>
> At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> SELinux test accordingly.
I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux
affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch
right now to clean this stuff up.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-04-21 1:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-03-26 13:38 Andy Lutomirski
2010-03-26 13:38 ` [PATCH 1/3] Add the execve_nosecurity syscall Andy Lutomirski
2010-03-26 13:38 ` [PATCH 2/3] Add PR_RESTRICT_ME to disable security-sensitive features for a process tree Andy Lutomirski
2010-03-26 13:38 ` [PATCH 3/3] Add PR_SET_FORCE_EXECVE_NOSECURITY to turn execve calls into execve_nosecurity Andy Lutomirski
2010-04-19 17:26 ` [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-19 21:32 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-19 21:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-19 22:02 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-19 22:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-20 12:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-04-20 14:23 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-20 14:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-20 15:11 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-21 21:15 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-21 22:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2010-04-20 15:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-04-20 15:53 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2010-04-21 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-04-21 1:37 ` Andrew Lutomirski [this message]
2010-04-21 2:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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