* [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected
2026-10-06 16:54 [Patch v2 0/4] Introduce Enhanced SMT Protection for SEV-SNP Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-10-06 16:54 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add host support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-10-06 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, x86, linux-kernel
Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky,
kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra, prsampat
When injecting an event into the guest via the event_inj field, a
non-zero event_inj value on #VMEXIT means that the hardware was not able
to inject the event into the guest. This used to only occur for the
VMEXIT_INVALID intercept code, which was a fatal error and resulted in
the guest being torn down.
Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) invalidates that assumption. When ESMTP
is enabled, VMRUN doesn't enter guest mode immediately; it stalls at a
synchronization point until every sibling thread is either idle or has
executed VMRUN for a legal sibling vCPU. If an ESMTP timeout / illegal
sibling exit / interrupt arrives while VMRUN is stalled, VMRUN can now
terminate with the corresponding #VMEXIT intercept code, without
entering guest mode, and thus without injecting the event.
For example, on a 2-way SMT core running vCPU0 on thread 0 and vCPU1 on
thread 1:
Thread 0 (vCPU0) Thread 1 (vCPU1)
---------------- ----------------
Interrupt A injected to the guest in host
VMRUN |
| |
v |
Stall waiting for sibling |
| |
| host INTR arrives on thread 0 |
| while it waits |
| |
v |
#VMEXIT v
Interrupt B injected to the guest idle
VMRUN
In this case injecting interrupt B clobbers the last event. Interrupt A
is never delivered and lost forever.
Therefore, in preparation for ESMTP support, accommodate for potentially
lost interrupts by detecting an undelivered injected event and
re-queuing it so as not to lose the event.
svm_cancel_injection() already recovers a staged event this way and
becomes redundant, so fold it in.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v1..v2: No changes
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7d59d301e1e5..5d15c706e43b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4340,6 +4340,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
u8 vector;
int type;
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
bool nmi_l1_to_l2 = svm->nmi_l1_to_l2;
bool soft_int_injected = svm->soft_int_injected;
@@ -4347,6 +4348,27 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
svm->soft_int_injected = false;
+ /*
+ * Hardware clears EVENTINJ field when it injects an event.
+ * A non-empty EVENTINJ on #VMEXIT means the vCPU never entered guest
+ * mode, and thus that the event was never delivered. Migrate the event
+ * to EXITINTINFO so that it's requeued instead of being dropped.
+ *
+ * An undelivered event doesn't imply a fatal VMEXIT_INVALID. With
+ * Enhanced SMT Protection, VMRUN may exit with an ordinary #VMEXIT
+ * without having injected that event into the guest.
+ *
+ * Clobbering EXITINTINFO is safe precisely because the vCPU never
+ * entered guest mode.
+ */
+ if (control->event_inj) {
+ control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
+ control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
+ control->event_inj = 0;
+
+ exitintinfo = control->exit_int_info;
+ }
+
/*
* If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
* executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
@@ -4410,11 +4432,14 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
- control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
- control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
- control->event_inj = 0;
+ /*
+ * EXITINTINFO is stale as it holds the event from the previous #VMEXIT
+ * (or from the last time the current VMCB was run). Invalidate it so
+ * that svm_complete_interrupts() requeues if and only if KVM staged an
+ * event in EVENTINJ.
+ */
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info = 0;
svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [Patch v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add host support for Enhanced SMT Protection
2026-10-06 16:54 [Patch v2 0/4] Introduce Enhanced SMT Protection for SEV-SNP Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-10-06 16:54 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/sev: Add guest " Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-10-06 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, x86, linux-kernel
Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky,
kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra, prsampat
Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) protects an SEV-SNP guest from SMT side
channels by requiring that, while a vCPU is in guest mode, its SMT sibling
thread is either idle in host mode or executing a vCPU the guest has
declared to be a legal sibling. A legal sibling is another ESMTP vCPU of
the same guest that carries the same VCPU_SIBLING_MASK and agrees on
VCPU_ID outside that mask.
Hardware enforces this at VMRUN, which no longer enters guest mode right
away but stalls until the condition holds. Three new exits report that it
could not be met, all of them non-fatal:
ESMTP_ILLSIB: a sibling thread is running a vCPU that is not a legal
sibling of this one.
ESMTP_TIMEOUT: the stall exceeded the timeout programmed in the VMCB. The
timer bounds how long VMRUN waits for the core to settle. A module
parameter exposes an interface to program this timer.
ESMTP_RETRY: If DBREQ is detected, VMRUN exits. ESMTP_RETRY indicates an
internal event and the hypervisor should execute a VMRUN.
Refer to the AMD64 APM Vol 2, section "AMD64 Enhanced SMT Protection".
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> # non-virtualization changes
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v1..v2
* Move idle wakeup ICR programming to svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()
instead of sev_hardware_setup()
* Remove cond_sched() in ESMTP exit paths
* Program the IDLE_WAKEUP_ICR for all present CPU siblings
* Add documentation for ESMTP timeout
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 19 ++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 12 ++++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 9 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
9 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 68647ff4bdd2..e09f18c0de34 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3240,6 +3240,25 @@ Kernel parameters
max_snp_asid == min_sev_asid-1, will effectively make
SEV-ES unusable.
+ kvm-amd.esmtp_timeout_ns=
+ [KVM,AMD] Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) VMRUN
+ timeout, in nanoseconds, for SEV-SNP guests that enable
+ ESMTP. When an ESMTP vCPU executes VMRUN, hardware
+ waits for every sibling thread to either be idle or
+ run a legal sibling vCPU of the same guest before
+ entering guest mode. If the wait exceeds this timeout,
+ VMRUN exits with VMEXIT_ESMTP_TIMEOUT and KVM retries
+ the VMRUN.
+
+ The value is converted to TSC cycles and programmed
+ into the VMCB when a vCPU is initialized, so changing
+ it at runtime only affects vCPUs that are created or
+ reset afterwards.
+
+ Default is 0, which disables the timeout, i.e. VMRUN
+ waits until the sibling condition is met or a physical
+ interrupt arrives.
+
kvm-arm.mode=
[KVM,ARM,EARLY] Select one of KVM/arm64's modes of
operation.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f70ee74b5f92..4cf477e95c58 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@
* and purposes if CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM is set).
*/
#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC_EXT (21*32+20) /* AMD SVM x2AVIC support for 4k vCPUs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_ESMTP (21*32+21) /* AMD Enhanced SMT Protection */
/*
* BUG word(s)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 3a8e51a0c9e8..fbcb3313e946 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_SEGMENT_SHIFT(x) (((x) & GENMASK_ULL(13, 8)) >> 8)
+#define MSR_AMD64_IDLE_WAKEUP_ICR 0xc0010137
#define MSR_SVSM_CAA 0xc001f000
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index aa63431ba92c..323ab7089302 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
u8 reserved_9[22];
u64 allowed_sev_features; /* Offset 0x138 */
u64 guest_sev_features; /* Offset 0x140 */
- u8 reserved_10[664];
+ u64 esmtp_timeout; /* Offset 0x148 */
+ u8 reserved_10[656];
/*
* Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved
* for use by hypervisor/software.
@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP BIT(17)
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
@@ -482,6 +484,11 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {
u8 fpreg_x87[80];
u8 fpreg_xmm[256];
u8 fpreg_ymm[256];
+ u8 reserved_0x670[560];
+
+ /* Enhanced SMT Protection */
+ u32 vcpu_id;
+ u32 vcpu_sibling_mask;
} __packed;
struct ghcb_save_area {
@@ -554,7 +561,7 @@ struct vmcb {
#define EXPECTED_VMCB_SAVE_AREA_SIZE 744
#define EXPECTED_GHCB_SAVE_AREA_SIZE 1032
-#define EXPECTED_SEV_ES_SAVE_AREA_SIZE 1648
+#define EXPECTED_SEV_ES_SAVE_AREA_SIZE 2216
#define EXPECTED_VMCB_CONTROL_AREA_SIZE 1024
#define EXPECTED_GHCB_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
@@ -589,6 +596,7 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x320);
BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x380);
BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x3f0);
+ BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x670);
BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(ghcb_save_area, 0x0);
BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(ghcb_save_area, 0xcc);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 010a45c9f614..e59baf4b3c3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -135,6 +135,10 @@
#define SVM_EXIT_SW 0xf0000000ull
#define SVM_EXIT_ERR -1ull
+/* Enhanced SMT Protection VM exits taken during VMRUN sibling sync */
+#define SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_ILLSIB -5ull /* Illegal ESMTP sibling */
+#define SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_TIMEOUT -6ull /* ESMTP_TIMEOUT expired */
+#define SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_RETRY -7ull /* Internal event; retry VMRUN */
#define SVM_EXIT_REASONS \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0, "read_cr0" }, \
@@ -246,7 +250,10 @@
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, "vmgexit_ext_guest_request" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION, "vmgexit_ap_creation" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES, "vmgexit_hypervisor_feature" }, \
- { SVM_EXIT_ERR, "invalid_guest_state" }
+ { SVM_EXIT_ERR, "invalid_guest_state" }, \
+ { SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_ILLSIB, "esmtp_illsib" }, \
+ { SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_TIMEOUT, "esmtp_timeout" }, \
+ { SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_RETRY, "esmtp_retry" }
#endif /* _UAPI__SVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 8665a6474806..16620fa0e290 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AMD_ESMTP, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x80000025, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_HTR_CORES, CPUID_EAX, 30, 0x80000026, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 5705723f1f41..df836dfe3e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -67,6 +67,11 @@ module_param_named(sev_snp, sev_snp_enabled, bool, 0444);
static unsigned int __ro_after_init nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids;
module_param_named(ciphertext_hiding_asids, nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids, uint, 0444);
+static unsigned long esmtp_timeout_ns;
+module_param(esmtp_timeout_ns, ulong, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(esmtp_timeout_ns,
+ "ESMTP VMRUN sibling-wait timeout in nanoseconds (0 disables the timer)");
+
#define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE 0
#define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT 1
#define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO 2
@@ -506,7 +511,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
return -EINVAL;
if (!snp_active)
- valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+ valid_vmsa_features &= ~(SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP);
if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1021,6 +1026,15 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->sev_features = sev->vmsa_features;
+ if (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP) {
+ save->vcpu_id = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+ /*
+ * All vCPUs of a guest are put into one group and can be run
+ * co-resident on the sibling thread of the same core.
+ */
+ save->vcpu_sibling_mask = U32_MAX;
+ }
+
/*
* Skip FPU and AVX setup with KVM_SEV_ES_INIT to avoid
* breaking older measurements.
@@ -3259,6 +3273,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_AMD_ESMTP))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP;
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -3290,6 +3307,31 @@ int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
return 0;
}
+void sev_esmtp_enable_wakeup_icr(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu, sibling, shift;
+ u32 core;
+
+ if (!(sev_supported_vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP))
+ return;
+
+ cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ shift = topology_get_domain_shift(TOPO_CORE_DOMAIN);
+ core = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu) >> shift;
+
+ for_each_present_cpu(sibling) {
+ u32 apicid = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, sibling);
+ u64 icr;
+
+ if (sibling == cpu || (apicid >> shift) != core)
+ continue;
+
+ icr = (u64)apicid << 32;
+ icr |= LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(wrmsrq_safe(MSR_AMD64_IDLE_WAKEUP_ICR, icr));
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
* returning them to the system.
@@ -4792,6 +4834,10 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = sev->vmsa_features |
VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID;
+ if (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_ESMTP)
+ svm->vmcb->control.esmtp_timeout = mul_u64_u32_div(esmtp_timeout_ns,
+ tsc_khz, 1000000);
+
/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 5d15c706e43b..624675a12d51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -591,6 +591,8 @@ static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
}
+ sev_esmtp_enable_wakeup_icr();
+
svm_init_os_visible_workarounds();
svm_init_erratum_383();
@@ -3743,6 +3745,12 @@ static int svm_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
return 0;
}
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_RETRY ||
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_ILLSIB ||
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ESMTP_TIMEOUT) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index e958943b8162..8cd8b825c9a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
+void sev_esmtp_enable_wakeup_icr(void);
int sev_dev_get_attr(u32 group, u64 attr, u64 *val);
extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);
@@ -1036,6 +1037,7 @@ static inline void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) {}
static inline void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) {}
static inline void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
static inline int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { return 0; }
+static inline void sev_esmtp_enable_wakeup_icr(void) {}
static inline int sev_dev_get_attr(u32 group, u64 attr, u64 *val) { return -ENXIO; }
#define max_sev_asid 0
static inline void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code) {}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [Patch v2 3/4] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
2026-10-06 16:54 [Patch v2 0/4] Introduce Enhanced SMT Protection for SEV-SNP Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add host support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-10-06 16:55 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-10-06 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, x86, linux-kernel
Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky,
kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra, prsampat
Enhanced SMT Protection requires every VMSA to carry the vCPU's identity
and the mask of SMT siblings it may co-run with. The guest builds the
VMSA itself when bringing up an AP, so populate both fields there, before
the page is turned into a VMSA and while it is still writable.
Fully set the sibling mask so that all threads of the same guest trust
each other.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v1..v2:
* Add ESMTP to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL and SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index c6512f2ea31e..4e0fa5a5f70b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \
- MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
@@ -204,7 +205,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
*/
#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
- SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
+ SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)
u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index cc292d7c6fd1..730cff2700d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC",
+ [MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT] = "ESMTProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry",
};
@@ -849,6 +850,18 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned
vmsa->vmpl = snp_vmpl;
vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) &&
+ (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)) {
+ vmsa->vcpu_id = apic_id;
+ /*
+ * The mask fully set puts every vCPU in one group, so any two
+ * of them may be co-resident. A legal ESMTP sibling must
+ * also match on ASID, so the sibling of a vCPU in guest mode is
+ * always either another vCPU of this same guest or idle.
+ */
+ vmsa->vcpu_sibling_mask = U32_MAX;
+ }
+
/* Populate AP's TSC scale/offset to get accurate TSC values. */
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
vmsa->tsc_scale = snp_tsc_scale;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index fbcb3313e946..6fd26151d146 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -745,7 +745,9 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT 18
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT)
-#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT 19
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 20)
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24
--
2.43.0
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