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From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
	maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org,  kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	joey.gouly@arm.com,  seiden@linux.ibm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
	 mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com, qperret@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs at EL2
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 16:21:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+EHjTyWDvVc4B0mF8+N3QJ=gVPGEY-pxPGZWuTLK6Y=PZnF1w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <arUUCFHamX1nOrB1@willie-the-truck>

Hi Will,

On Thu, 24 Sep 2026 13:14:00 +0100, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
[...]
> > It's not publishing data, it's handing reset_state back.
>
> What's the difference? The usual pattern for acquire/release is:
>
> <write data>
> <store-release flag>
>
> on one CPU and then on another:
>
> <load-acquire flag>     // If this reads from the release above...
> <read data>             // ... then this is guaranteed to read the written data
>
> That's a message-passing shape and you would normally say that the first
> CPU (the producer) is publishing the data to the other CPU (the consumer).
>
> Is this what is happening with the 'reset_state' (data) and the
> 'power_state' (flag)? If not, then what is the shape?

I don't think so, it's the other direction. That pattern is the pair
on reset_state.reset, and it isn't in question. The pair on
power_state, as I see it, runs the other way: the target's last
accesses to reset_state are its reads of the payload and its clear of
the flag in pkvm_reset_vcpu(), and the next CPU_ON's accesses are
stores. Release on OFF, acquire on the cmpxchg: unlock then lock, with
power_state as the lock word. The winner takes it with the cmpxchg,
hands it to the target through reset, and the target gives it up at
CPU_OFF. Nothing is published. What I was after is the winner's stores
being ordered after the target's reads and its clear.

> > The CPU_ON winner writes reset_state.{pc, r0, be}, then reset_state.reset
> > with a release. The target reads them and clears reset in pkvm_reset_vcpu()
> > on its next run
>
> By 'next run' you mean, at EL2 on the entry path into the guest following
> a successful CPU_ON operation?

Yes. The target's first __kvm_vcpu_run hypercall after the host's
kvm_psci_vcpu_on() has woken it. handle___kvm_vcpu_run() reads
power_state as ON_PENDING and calls pkvm_reset_vcpu() before entering
the guest.

> > and its CPU_OFF hands reset_state on to the next
> > CPU_ON. The release on OFF orders those reads and that clear before
> > OFF, and an acquire on the winner's cmpxchg orders its writes after
> > it: release on the way out, acquire on the way in, like a lock.
>
> That doesn't make sense to me, sorry. You're saying that the release
> store in the EL2 CPU_OFF hypercall handler is ordering stores that were
> made during the initial CPU_ON handling on that vCPU? Since then, we've
> been in and out of the guest. We really shouldn't need extra barriers to
> create order there.

The target's own accesses at its reset, its reads of the payload and
its clear of the flag. You're right that the hardware orders them:
__kvm_vcpu_run() runs dsb(nsh) before it restores the guest's state,
and since R24234 the NSH is only a TLBI/IC scope, so that DSB orders
the target's accesses before OFF for every PE. My reasoning for the
release and the acquire was that the protocol shouldn't rest on a
barrier that is there for the translation regime, that nothing
documents as ordering EL2 state for other CPUs, and that the LKMM,
having no dsb(), can't see: under the model the target's accesses and
the next winner's are unordered without them. Would you rather rely on
the world switch and say so at that dsb(nsh)?

> > Without the release, the target's clear of reset can become visible
> > after the next winner's reset = true, and the target's next
> > pkvm_reset_vcpu() then reads a clear flag and returns -ECANCELED,
> > leaving the vCPU stuck at ON_PENDING.
>
> This needs a litmus test because I can't see it myself. As above,
> CPU_OFF does not clear the reset state, so it's bizarre to put the
> release there.

I'd actually done that earlier.

The flag, under the LKMM (herd7 7.58 with mainline's tools/memory-model):

        C CPU_OFF-flag

        (*
         * P0, the target: its reset clears reset_state.reset, its
         * CPU_OFF stores power_state = OFF. P1, the next CPU_ON:
         * cmpxchg(OFF -> ON_PENDING), then a release of reset.
         * OFF=0 ON=1 ON_PENDING=2.
         *)

        {
                power_state = 1;
                reset = 1;
        }

        P0(int *power_state, int *reset)
        {
                *reset = 0;
                WRITE_ONCE(*power_state, 0);
        }

        P1(int *power_state, int *reset)
        {
                int r1;

                r1 = cmpxchg_relaxed(power_state, 0, 2);
                if (r1 == 0)
                        smp_store_release(reset, 1);
        }

        exists (1:r1=0 /\ reset=0)

As written: Sometimes, and a data race. With smp_store_release() for
the OFF store: Never. CPU_OFF doesn't touch reset_state, but its OFF
store is what a CPU_ON takes with the cmpxchg, so it seemed to me the
store the target's accesses should be ordered before.

> > and in pvm_psci_vcpu_on():
> >
> >         /*
> >          * vCPUs race to power on the same target. The acquire pairs with the
> >          * release of OFF in pvm_psci_vcpu_off(): the target's accesses to
> >          * reset_state in pkvm_reset_vcpu() precede the writes below.
> >          */
> >         power_state = cmpxchg_acquire(&target->power_state,
> >                                       PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_OFF,
> >                                       PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_ON_PENDING);
>
> This confused me more :( Why are you talking about accesses preceding an
> acquire? An acquire only orders later accesses.

Agreed, it reads as if the acquire ordered earlier accesses. For v4:

        /*
         * vCPUs race to power on the same target. The acquire orders the
         * writes below after the cmpxchg's read of OFF, and with the release
         * of OFF in pvm_psci_vcpu_off() that puts them after the target's
         * reads and clear of reset_state in pkvm_reset_vcpu().
         */

> I really think we need some litmus tests to understand the general ordering
> problems we have here before adding the memory barriers.

The other direction, the payload:

        C CPU_ON-payload

        (*
         * P0, the target: its reset reads reset_state.pc, its CPU_OFF
         * stores OFF with a release. P1, the next CPU_ON:
         * cmpxchg(OFF -> ON_PENDING), then a plain store to pc.
         * OFF=0 ON=1 ON_PENDING=2.
         *)

        {
                power_state = 1;
                pc = 0;
        }

        P0(int *power_state, int *pc)
        {
                int r0;

                r0 = *pc;
                smp_store_release(power_state, 0);
        }

        P1(int *power_state, int *pc)
        {
                int r1;

                r1 = cmpxchg_relaxed(power_state, 0, 2);
                if (r1 == 0)
                        *pc = 1;
        }

        exists (1:r1=0 /\ 0:r0=1)

As written: Sometimes, and a data race. With cmpxchg_acquire(): Never.
Those two are what's behind the release (v3) and the acquire (v4). The
rollback's ON_PENDING -> OFF cmpxchg in handle_pvm_entry_hvc64() has
the same pattern on the source side, so v4 makes it a release too.

My head is spinning now :)

Cheers,
/fuad

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-24 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-14 11:33 [PATCH v3 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 14:34   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 16:35   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 16:37     ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 17:07   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-23  9:51     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24  8:30       ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 11:26         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24 12:14           ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 15:21             ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-10-01 12:58               ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11                 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 12:59   ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-14 14:43     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-15 11:02       ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-15 11:19         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:27   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:05     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:30   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:07     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-17  8:06       ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-17 18:42         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-18 13:21         ` Will Deacon
2026-09-18 13:24           ` Will Deacon
2026-09-27  8:20           ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-27 12:37             ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-28 19:00             ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:43   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:08     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba

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